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【突發評論大長篇🇱🇧🇮🇱🇮🇷🇵🇸】 真主黨領袖納斯魯拉被暗殺:半世紀以來影響最大的暗殺・與以色列的戰爭宣言

以色列策動黎巴嫩真主黨數千部 Call 機、對講機大爆炸之後,立刻雷厲風行展開連串空襲,行動再出現了戲劇性高潮:領導真主黨已經32年的老牌領袖納斯魯拉(Hassan Nasrallah)確定已經被以色列「定點清除」暗殺,同時被殺的還有一大批真主黨高層,這已經成為半個世紀以來影響最大的中東政治暗殺案。以色列有這樣大手筆的動作,也宣告了一個全新時代的到來:為甚麼納斯魯拉之死,比蓋達的拉登、哈瑪斯的哈尼亞等被殺更震撼?內塔尼亞胡的真正目的,又是甚麼?

先說其他暗殺案。

雖然中東政治暗殺不絕,不少更是以色列特工的傑作,但和納斯魯拉相比,那些暗殺都不會真的影響結構。例如拉登死時,他創立的蓋達組織早已四分五裂、低度運作;哈瑪斯採取集體領導,哈尼亞並沒有一言九鼎的權力;即使是二十年前以色列暗殺了哈瑪斯創辦人亞辛,他也只是一個精神領袖,不負責具體執行任務;至於恐怖份子札卡維、巴格達迪等等,死的都是一個大gangster,他們本來在群眾當中的存在感就不強,組織並非圍繞個人旋轉。

但納斯魯拉不一樣。

他自從1992年繼承真主黨領袖,就一手扭轉了它的發展方向。本來真主黨頂多做一些綁架人質、炸彈爆破等典型恐怖組織做的事,納斯魯拉卻讓真主黨迅速發展成為全球其中一支最強的民兵,擁有重型武器,包括可以直接射到以色列的大量導彈,甚至具備了和以色列正規軍作戰的實力。納斯魯拉本身就是民兵出身,軍事上具有發言權,也直接決定了真主黨的發展路向。

與此同時,納斯魯拉也是魅力型領袖,演說技巧精湛,經常被國際媒體拿來與卡斯特羅、捷古華拉等傳奇人物相提並論。真主黨起家之時,文宣戰佔了非常重要的發展元素,真主黨甚至有自己的「大外宣」燈塔電視台,成為中東最有影響力的媒體之一。納斯魯拉也就成了什葉派頭號KOL,由於經常發言,人氣甚至比他的「阿公」伊朗最高精神領袖哈梅內伊更強。雖然納斯魯拉並非教士出身,但也在什葉派聖城納傑夫讀過幾年宗教,現在被稱為「al-Sayyaid Hassan」,也就是被認可為什葉派奉為祖先的阿里的直系後裔,也是伊斯蘭教先知穆罕默德的直系後裔。

和其他伊朗扶植的武裝相比,真主黨已經成功「建制化」,成為了黎巴嫩政府的一部份,這也是納斯魯拉政治手腕的展現。本來真主黨是拒絕參與政府的,但在黎巴嫩和平進程已成定局之後,又擔心被邊緣化,於是決定全面參與議會政治,雖然被一些基本教義派視為「出賣理想」,但結果顯示真主黨的政治支部是成功的。如果論軍力,黎巴嫩內戰期間還有其他力量,但由於真主黨拒絕交出武器,現在已經一家獨大;論政治影響力,黎巴嫩內部教派林立,真主黨代表的什葉派勢力並非主流,但現在真主黨加入了「三月九日執政聯盟」,雖然自身只有國會十多席、兩個部長席位,但由於聯盟是執政黨,而真主黨又握有武裝,變相令真主黨擁有了控制政府的權力,而又不用承擔全部責任。

納斯魯拉一死,本來已經難找接班人,更誇張的是這次以色列是暗殺了幾乎一整代的真主黨領導人。當時納斯魯拉召集真主黨高層秘密會議,會議地點在地面六十呎下的地底,理應非常安全,以色列卻獲得絕密情報,動用了超過二千磅炸彈,將地面至地底全部炸毀,不惜將地面上的平民全部消滅。行動中同時被殺的,包括真主黨南部戰區總司令,伊朗革命衛隊副總司令兼駐黎巴嫩最高代表等等,加上在過去幾個月,真主黨高層已經接二連三被以色列暗殺,無論誰來接班,都很難有足夠資歷和說服力。

以色列的行動有明確訊號:不再容忍真主黨作為一支軍隊存在於地表上,更不容許在以色列北部邊境存在。接下來的行動,相信還要摧毀真主黨的整個武器庫,讓真主黨這支軍隊還原為納斯魯拉之前的「普通恐怖組織」,只能進行小規模的襲擊,不能對以色列國家安全構成根本挑戰。這個目標要達到,恐怕不能單靠空襲,也就是以色列地面部隊應該已經預備了出動,中東大戰不可能在加沙停下來。

內塔尼亞胡如此「進取」,早已經超越了報復哈瑪斯策動恐怖襲擊的目標,也和拯救人質無關。然而值得注意的是,以色列民意對攻擊真主黨是高度支持的,基本上沒有不同意見,反而對怎樣攻擊哈瑪斯去營救人質就意見分歧。換句話說,這一波行動可以讓內塔尼亞胡戰時內閣提高民望,也可以合理化他繼續執政,不會因為加沙戰爭終結而下台,再面對可能要被審判、坐牢的人生命運。那些反對勢力在對真主黨作戰之時,相信亦不會動員起來。

根據內塔尼亞胡日前在聯合國的講話,他的目標還包括伊朗,也就是暗示不排除直接攻擊伊朗的可能性。這或許是警告伊朗不要大規模援助真主黨的虛張聲勢,但同樣可能是內塔尼亞胡的軍事佈局:一旦真主黨主力被殲滅,依然有下一個目標,戰爭還是可以永續下去。

對永續中東戰爭這一點,目前就不符美國利益,但美國又不能對納斯魯拉被殺不表示歡迎,因為那是美國眼中的恐怖份子;何況美國大選期間,根本沒有人有能力壓制內塔尼亞胡。黎巴嫩的前宗主國法國也不會希望戰爭擴大,但以色列不會理會馬克龍的態度。俄羅斯倒是希望中東戰爭打得越久越好,這樣可以分散烏克蘭戰爭的國際關注之餘,也可以在西方內部製造裂痕。起碼在短期內,內塔尼亞胡是有恃無恐的,而且正因為他在內部沒有退路,反而做出了歷屆以色列政府都想做、而不能下定決心做的事。無論怎樣評價他,內塔尼亞胡也已經「歷史留名」。

▶️ 破局關鍵:實力遠比哈瑪斯強大的黎巴嫩真主黨,會出兵參戰圍攻以色列嗎?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utBlbcKn4kI

【突發評論大長篇🇱🇧🇮🇱🇮🇷🇵🇸】 真主黨領袖納斯魯拉被暗殺:半世紀以來影響最大的暗殺・與以色列的戰爭宣言

Comments

真心覺得以色列呢d先係做嘢. 打仗點會冇collateral damage? 以色列就係因為一慣殺雞用牛刀咁打所以先可以鎮住鄰國而有機會normalise同鄰國嘅外交. 如果吓吓頭痛醫頭咁打法只會拖長armed conflict嘅時間最終只會更多傷亡. 班左膠同UN日日喺度9叫講真UN咁多嘴咪搵peacekeeper頂住IDF保護平民,見一支以色列道彈攔截一支,見一架坦克打一架咁咪做到佢哋口中嘅“先生唔好打交”囉

Alan Poon

精準打擊,而不推翻政權

堅離地書院 College

又係去挑戰宗教 學唔精的 死下人囉 伊朗有proxy 既原因係d proxy 窮 以色列去打D窮人 除非好錢多啦 玩完黎巴嫩我認為件事完 敍利亞同伊拉克係大到大家玩唔起 美國既教訓係打驘唔難 打完點處理先麻煩 擺兵冇益有浪費金錢 唔擺兵佢又返黎 分分鐘黎過仲癲既

Good Year

他依然嘗試與以色列、伊朗都局部和解,提高自己的議價能力

堅離地書院 College

國內提升民望、渡過政治危機,對外避免伊朗新總統與沙特 / 西方和解

堅離地書院 College

以色列目標應是將伊朗還原為普通國家,而伊朗如果接受則可以避免開戰(見第二部份)

堅離地書院 College

Israeli army will enter into Lebanon no doubt. Heavy civilian casualties no doubt. Aftermath... please refer to part 2 of the article.

堅離地書院 College

冇咩組織既恐怖組織先最麻煩 3日唔埋2日自殺式恐襲你 比有個目標比你打麻煩好多

Good Year

係咪今時今日恐怖組織勢力大不如前?以前有人燒下可蘭經已經驚驚。衣家明刀明槍炸你都唔怕

James Green

伊朗似乎無計可試,真的一物治一物,不知世界會變好或變差,希望沈教授可以分析沙特王儲既立場,似乎他不在乎以色列係中東既戰爭,會唔會都引起伊斯蘭世界不滿

pp lam

個人認為係以色列國力唔容許, 你想對有章法既伊朗定係, 日日真主萬歲恐襲既ISIS先? 大家又好似唔記得左, 有個把係度梗係有野打, 都無個把, 全民遊兵散勇你都唔炸邊個! ISIS話好話快D炸散佢 我又可以返黎

Good Year

如果以色列去到想殺邊個就殺到邊個嘅程度,我都想了解下點解要揀呢個時機? BTW,我懷疑就算獨裁陣營講到幾勁都好,當認真棍起上黎,美歐陣營嘅財力、科技同手段係遠超佢地想像。只要有內搭尼亞胡呢 d 政治人物要自救將個道德底線推低,一出手就真係知邊個先係行家。

Gary Lee

我就認為未必, 打開張地圖, 黎巴嫩呢搞得掂既, 國土又唔大又係旁邊, 仲多派方勢利, 鏟走真主黨扶一個親以色列上去無問題, 打伊朗?你點過叙利亞先? 唔係佢個政府難搞, 係叙利亞咁大咁多唔成氣既反對派, 你又想佔領全境? 以色列人口幾多萬啊? 陸軍有幾多人啊? 無記錯出哂預備役先60萬鬆D, 扣起D唔打得既, 唔夠人, 日日恐怖襲擊喎。 仲有一大片伊拉克要搞埋喎, 空襲保証搞唔掂, 否則美國佬一早搞掂左啦。

Good Year

一直都話強國之間避免直接交戰。但今次以色列步步進迫,伊朗參戰睇黎勢在必行。會導致災難性結果嗎?

James Green

After the Hamas-led terrorist attack, Israel has demonstrated a high tolerance for civilian casualties, particularly when targeting high-value figures. Israel has clearly shifted its tit-for-tat responses to a proactive campaign aimed at dismantling Hezbollah's missile arsenals, launchers, and military hierarchy. While these military actions target legitimate objectives in warfare, the unfortunate collateral damage involving civilians has drawn international condemnation towards Israel with limited tangible results. However, the blame for these tragic civilian casualties lies more with Hezbollah. Hassan Nasrallah, a long-standing target of Israeli intelligence, frequently used civilian areas as a shield by hiding in residential buildings. Like other militant groups, he was fighting for his own sake, not the interests of the people he claimed to represent. In death as in life, he continues to keep both his fellow fighters and Lebanese people resentful of his reign living in fear because Israel seems unlikely to cease its actions following his killing. The elimination of Nasrallah, as noted by Dr. Shen, signifies a pivotal moment. The event of the October 7 massacre was transformative, unfolding like a script from a Hollywood movie. It showcased a blend of long-deployed intelligence, infiltration tactics, technological prowess, and, above all, unwavering political resolve. The disruption of Hezbollah's communication systems through the sabotage of pagers and walkie-talkies resulted in the neutralization of numerous fighters. Furthermore, targeted airstrikes against Hezbollah's top leaders underscore the extent of Israeli intelligence infiltration within their ranks. Following the appointment of a leader with limited authority, it’s likely the beginning of Hezbollah's fragmentation. We’ll see whether the potential factionalism within Hezbollah will weaken its threat to Israel or Hezbollah’s power decentralization will pose greater challenges for Israel in intelligence tasks. Before either scenario unfolds, Hezbollah hardliners should have realized that it’s now imminent to weigh two options: whether to escalate by launching more missiles and rockets deeper into Israel and inciting Israel’s regional foes to engage in a full-scale war, or to exercise restraint, thereby risking further damage to its reputation as one of the most formidable fighting machines in the Middle East and shattering its long-established deterrence against Israel. Ali Khamenei has once again vowed revenge. But his backed proxies are likely to make less of his words than his capabilities of turning fervent rhetoric into actions. If one were in Khamenei’s shoes, he wouldn’t feel secure even within his stronghold of Tehran after Israel’s recent display of stunning military and intelligence capabilities. His fear may have frustrated some Hezbollah members that Tehran has yet to give its Lebanese proxy any real support other than paying lip service. The West should learn from Israel's painful experience: increasing repression without effective deterrence is very costly. When a nation lowers its guard against an implacable foe, it risks paying a steep price. Israel's experience highlights the significance of recalibrating deterrence through asymmetrical means, with Hezbollah standing as a formidable testament to this resolve. The WSJ just reported that Israeli special forces have been carrying out small, targeted raids into southern Lebanon to gather intelligence and assess the situation ahead of a potential ground incursion. The West may raise a crucial question as to Israel’s disproportionate counterattacks: is the best way to deal with opponents who lack moral standards to set aside moral norms and engage in an all-out war? How far must the situation escalate for Israel to be willing to cease the conflict? Labeling Benjamin Netanyahu, aka Bibi, as a remarkable yet controversial leader does not border to foreseeing his ultimate success or failure, nor does it entail full approval or disapproval of all his actions. It suggests that he’s neither righteous nor steeped in blood. We just can’t view the full picture of the escalating Middle East conflict without giving Bibi, if not the devil, his due. He stands as a political mastermind, towering over his detractors and competitors through his precise calculations. Despite facing political challenges at home and growing strictures on his government abroad, he has maintained a firm grip on power for a duration and with an impact that surpassed most expectations following the attack on October 7th. We’ll see how the new landscape of the Middle East—be it a new order or in a state of chaos—will look under the grand strategy of a game changer.

George

求仁得仁

Dxv


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