【國際關係深度評 🇺🇸🇻🇪】 美國的委內瑞拉軍事行動，有沒有不違反國際法的可能？（一）
Added 2026-01-07 23:01:02 +0000 UTC不少會員希望談談美國出動三角洲部隊生擒委內瑞拉總統馬杜羅的國際法問題。但「國際法」從來不是一部單一法典，這個問題本身，就有提問人不一定為意的前設。所以要討論，就不能簡單給予維基百科或 ChatGPT 的答案，而一定要這幾天比較長篇大論的去談。
我是這樣看的：
在香港時，我的大學課程有兩班都和國際法有關，一班是本科，另一班是碩士。如果是本科課程，這個問題基本上「很容易」回答，搬字過紙，就可以援引《聯合國憲章》第2(4)條：「各國不得以武力威脅或使用武力侵害他國的領土完整或政治獨立」。中國大陸官媒的第一時間反應，就是引用這條條文，譴責美國違反國際法。
西方國家的左翼群眾也是大多數援引這條條文，加上一個經典案例：1984年的尼加拉瓜訴美國案。
這是國際法庭（ICJ）的經典案例，當時尼加拉瓜左翼政府由蘇聯支持的桑地諾民族解放陣線組成，意識形態強烈反美；美國則支持右翼游擊隊，並在尼加拉瓜境內和海域，進行了一系列「軍事及準軍事行動」。尼加拉瓜政府對國際法庭控告美國侵犯主權，最終國際法庭判決尼加拉瓜勝訴，要求美國賠償。但美國在判決之前，就推出了ICJ（到今天也是），並以自己在聯合國安理會的否決權，否決賠償給尼加拉瓜的一切議案。直到後來尼加拉瓜變天，親美政權上台撤控為止。
對本科生而言，也許知道有這樣的條文、這樣的案例，就已經「足夠」。但這樣的答案，其實是非常不全面的。如果同一條問題出現在碩士課程，問題就會變成：如果你是美國政府的國際法專家，可以如何辯解這次行動沒有違反國際法？
這樣的思維方式，就比較貼近現實。
美國這次行動的同類案件，在過往其實也不定期發生。如果要辯解，主要有三個方向：
一、得到委內瑞拉政府同意，讓美國「合法」入境協助執法。就像上個月，特朗普政府空襲尼日利亞北部的恐怖份子基地，事後尼日利亞政府就要連忙「追認」，說美軍是在尼日利亞同意下入境。雖然這明顯是避免尷尬和爭議的下臺階，但起碼是一個國際社會認可的說法。
但其實很多時候，邀請他國入境的「政府」，也可以是「另一個政府」。就像敘利亞內戰期間，國家四分五裂，不同國家都在承認不同政府，也可以應自己承認的政府「邀請」，而出兵或干涉內戰。今天的也門內戰，也是大同小異，沙特、阿聯酋已經是親密盟友，各自支持的也門「政府」就互相衝突。
至於最終有沒有「違反國際法」，很多時候就是看成王敗寇。例如今日的敘利亞合法政府，一年前不過是一批散兵游勇游擊隊，但現在爆冷奪權成功，支持他們的土耳其就忽然變成「合法援助」。美國早就宣佈不承認馬杜羅的委內瑞拉政府，雖然也沒有承認反對派「另立中央」，但如果之後出現「regime change」，而新政權追認當時曾經秘密邀請美國出兵「平亂」，雖然依然很難說服第三方，但起碼可以作為片面證供。
（待續）
Comments
可以係委內瑞拉平行政府提出，見第二篇
堅離地書院 College
2026-01-11 12:12:17 +0000 UTCTo be more constructive, a revised set of codes should be introduced rather than merely deconstructing the existing ones. Let's see.
堅離地書院 College
2026-01-11 12:11:41 +0000 UTC視乎國內權力核心中人如何回應
堅離地書院 College
2026-01-11 12:10:57 +0000 UTCICJ 需要雙方同意才可以開庭，但PCA 可以單方面提出訴訟的
堅離地書院 College
2026-01-11 12:10:25 +0000 UTC最有力嘅理據，係Maduro叫侵拉佢，同方唐鏡一樣，佢叫我打先打
Sing Hei Hayden Tse
2026-01-08 18:18:33 +0000 UTCMany claim that the ouster of Nicolás Maduro through military action represents the death of international law. This view is both misleading and historically blind. Far from undermining law, his removal signals that force can sometimes serve justice when international institutions have failed utterly. Maduro’s downfall was good news. For years, Venezuelans endured misery, exile, torture, and murder at the hands of a tyrant who crushed dissent with brutality. To see a poverty-stricken people freed from such oppression is to witness the restoration of dignity. While infringements of sovereignty is rejected on principle, the elation of Venezuelans was justified. Bystanders have no say in dictating what is good or bad for Venezuelans’ future. US intervention in Venezuela was not so much a violation of law as a vindication of its deeper spirit: the protection of human rights over the absolute sovereignty of criminals. It came as no surprise that Venezuela’s allies—Russia, Iran, mainland China, along with dictator cheerleaders in the US and the far-left across the West—took offense. Their outrage reflects not a principled defense of law but a cynical defense of political interests. To equate Maduro’s removal with a mortal blow to international law is to confuse shielding dictators with the protection of justice. Critics argue that by capturing an indicted dictator, Donald Trump “gave wings” to Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. But this’s a lazy and ahistorical narrative. These ruthless imperialists needed no precedent from Caracas to justify their aggression: they’d already murdered dissidents aboard, annexed Crimea, invaded Donbas, attempted to seize all of Ukraine, imposed junta rule in HK, militarily threatened Taiwan, and supported atrocities worldwide. Volodymyr Zelensky himself survived numerous assassination attempts long before Maduro’s fall. Their political calculus is often driven less by precedent than by the interplay of ambition, confidence, and risk appetite, reinforced by the conviction that military strength enables both the achievement of goals and the management of unfolding dynamics. Dictators were born with complete contempt for international law, though they’re happy to keep it in their playbook as a political tool against adversaries. Trampling on those laws is always on the agenda whenever it serves their own interests. As a result, the last three decades are littered with violations, massacres, and annexations that international law failed to prevent—from Sarajevo and Kigali to Aleppo, Mariupol, and Khartoum. These testify to the impotence of institutions that too often retreated in the face of atrocity. History offers clearer lessons: interventions like Tanzania’s 1979 ousting of Idi Amin or NATO’s 1999 action in Kosovo—both without full UN approval—ended genocidal regimes and saved lives when the Security Council was paralyzed. International law did not die in Caracas; it had long been hollowed out by inaction elsewhere. Thus, Maduro’s ouster should be seen not as the collapse of law but as a rare moment of moral rearmament. Democracies, long paralyzed by hesitation, may rediscover the principle—rooted in just war traditions—that force can sometimes enforce law when institutions fail to do so. In truth, the death of international law lies not in the removal of tyrants but in the persistent failure to confront them. To conflate Maduro’s fall with lawlessness is to invert reality: it was not Caracas that killed international law, but the endless aggressions of dictators and the indifference that enabled them. In Caracas, law was not buried—it was, imperfectly, defended. And justly so, for dictators never abide by international law—only by force. Therefore, the only language they understand when one has the means is force. Having said that, a successful US president shouldn’t reduce America’s role in the world to “might-makes-right.” Looking ahead, the key determinant of how Trump’s call for this bold military operation is rated will likely be the extent to which remaining Venezuelan authorities comply with US demands and facilitate an orderly transition. More important, it’ll be judged by how the lives of ordinary Venezuelans are genuinely improved in the post-Maduro era. Furthermore, Trump would help his own course if he broke new ground in the Greenland affair without resorting to military occupation, though he and his cabinet appear to have staged a familiar MAGA set piece: a “start high, end low” dealmaking show.
George
2026-01-08 12:36:59 +0000 UTC只要是upper hand, 候補劇本 皆大歡喜 tomorrow is another day🙂
Jaime wong
2026-01-08 04:23:36 +0000 UTC老美依家就係飛越條文, 只談國力, 完。另委國有無提出訴訟先? 無咁....無受害人, 又無人有損失咁告咩先? 國際法有公訴呢尾野既咩?
Good Year
2026-01-08 03:59:34 +0000 UTC個標題幾耐人尋味
KTH
2026-01-08 01:23:03 +0000 UTC
