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【突發評論:國際冷知識 🇺🇸🇩🇰】 如果美國出兵格陵蘭,北約會怎樣?

以下討論純粹基於學術探討,出現的可能性極低。但作為邏輯思辯,卻又很有討論價值,因為也可以適用在很多其他例子。問題很簡單:如果美國在特朗普下令下,真的出兵丹麥自治領地格陵蘭,北約又有集體防禦機制去怎對「外敵」,那北約到底會怎樣?

有一些評論強調根據北約的官方條文,理論上,北約成員國之間本來就不應該出現軍事衝突,因為北約第一條列明,成員應該用「和平方式」解決一切衝突:

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

但上述這類條文是典型的無約束力條文,就像聯合國憲章一樣。如果期望所有聯合國會員國加入聯合國之後,都不會和任何其他會員國發生軍事衝突,那就是格林童話。這類綱領性條文從來都不會有任何後果,因為條文根本沒有違約條款,從來不會有國家當真。

如果美國入侵格陵蘭,而格陵蘭目前屬於丹麥,丹麥又是北約成員國,這自然是一個嚴重議題。本來北約成立時,就有意識將成員國的殖民地排除在共同防衛機制之外,這才有了北約第六條,將地理範圍嚴格限制在「北大西洋」(還有個別當時的北約成員國領土,例如法國的「阿爾及利亞部門」),此所以1982年的福克蘭群島戰爭雖然是北約成員國英國的海外領地被阿根廷入侵,但依然與北約無關。但格陵蘭、法羅群島這兩個丹麥自治領地都位於北大西洋,也就必然被包括在內。

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer......

所以關鍵還是共同防禦條款的第五條,也就是攻擊一個國家等同攻擊全體北約國家的條款。對這條條款,坊間有不少誤解,畢竟根據條文本身,其實賦予了莫大彈性。

首先,需要一個被攻擊的北約成員國主動啟動第五條條款,也就是被攻擊的國家可以選擇不啟動。而北約成立以來,成員國自然不會沒有遇到被襲擊的前科,但唯一啟動的一次,就是美國在9/11之後。沒有啟動的例子有很多,例如俄烏戰爭期間,俄羅斯導彈久不久就試探性的落在波蘭領土之內,或越過波羅的海三國領空耀武揚威,但北約國家都選擇息事寧人,邏輯上的解說就是認為那尚未構成「armed attack」:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

而如果丹麥真的要啟動第五條,北約內部又會如何決定?

根據北約條約,第五條並沒有寫明決策機制,沒有要求成員國需要投票,一致通過這是足以啟動共同防禦機制的「armed attack」。但參考北約其他決策機制,例如要求接納新成員國必須全體會員同意(這是芬蘭、瑞典年前加入北約時,土耳其可以討價還價的原因),與及其他協定普遍要求成員國「consent」,起碼可以推論當成員國不能一致同意的時候,其實是很難正式啟動第五條的。如果入侵格陵蘭的是美國,就很難相信北約可以啟動第五條去針對美國入侵。如果丹麥要求北約其他成員國出兵協防,那就是要在北約條款之外的另外行動。

那如果出現了上述北約成員國之間的軍事衝突,而第五條又不能啟動,是否代表北約就要瓦解?這卻有點滑坡邏輯。歷史上,北約成員國之間自然不可能沒有衝突,最嚴重的衝突發生在土耳其和希臘之間,除了兩國本來就是世仇,在塞浦路斯更是南方、北方各自的代理人,兩國軍隊分別支持這兩個塞浦路斯政府,並有直接參與塞浦路斯內戰。雖然兩國都沒有借助北約條款解決衝突,塞浦路斯南北分裂至今,但沒有借助北約的原因,大概是明白就算要正式嘗試啟動第五條,也不會獲得通過。

如果衝突雙方是美國和丹麥,理論上,也不會有分別。

如果北約的歐洲成員國為聲援丹麥,覺得美國已經是國家安全威脅,而要將美國驅逐出北約?這固然代表北約廢掉武功,但技術上,其實這是做不到的,因為北約條約並沒有任何一條,列明成員國可以驅逐任何成員國離開,畢竟主要決策都是需要一致通過的,除非被驅逐的國家也自願離開、還要是接受以被驅逐的方式離開,否則就沒有通過的可能。如果規則不是這樣,土耳其、匈牙利這些國家,近年就不可能利用這個結構性漏洞來為所欲為。

換句話說,只要美國一日不主動退出北約,就算真的入侵另一個北約國家,而明天俄羅斯又入侵再一個北約國家,後者還是可以啟動北約第五條,美國還是可以出兵協助歐洲聯防。

當然,第五條也真的寫得很彈性,協防的國家可以自行決定用甚麼方式協助:「such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force」,這裏「使用軍隊」只不過是「任何行動」的其中一個例子,換了是提供情報、提供軍備、提供經濟援助、提供後勤、提供「強烈譴責」外交聲明、提供口頭支持、提供念力、提供啦啦隊打氣,都可以是「deems necessary」的方式。

說到底,國際條約都是防君子的。

【突發評論:國際冷知識 🇺🇸🇩🇰】 如果美國出兵格陵蘭,北約會怎樣?

Comments

To some extents, NATO hasnt really been tested, especially after the post-CW enlargement. Article 5 (and also other articles) is indeed very vague, as seen above.

堅離地書院 College

通常係調轉,美國政府真係要合併格陵蘭必須國會通過

堅離地書院 College

美國要同歐洲國家博弈格陵蘭,點都要有嘢offer,例如烏克蘭

堅離地書院 College

佢每日都有新agenda,但格陵蘭呢個議題係第一任期已經開始

堅離地書院 College

主權範圍內,視乎有無簽合約

堅離地書院 College

似乎也有意推倒重來,曾定義會員分級制

堅離地書院 College

Many assume Article 5 forces all NATO members to take collective actions. In reality, it merely obliges solidarity but leaves the method of support open, as mentioned in the piece. Such ambiguity can create political tension if allies disagree on the appropriate level of response, and it offers opportunities for enemies to test their red lines. In the end, the credibility of NATO depends less on legal compulsion and more on political will and deterrence. The US consistently contributes the largest share of defense expenditure (nearly 65%) in NATO, far surpassing all other allies combined. This reflects both its global military commitments and its role as NATO’s backbone. In fact, NATO has given the US political influence and an extensive footprint of military bases across Europe, so it's unlikely that the US will withdraw from NATO, and equally unlikely that the recession‑stricken EU would expel its largest funder under the shadow of Russia and its axis of resistance. Trump has long bristled at the international order and organizations that drag US allies into the economic and political orbit of adversaries, binding them to an architecture that serves rival interests. His fixation on Greenland, staged as an aggressive annexation gambit, is not so much about resources as about bending Brussels to his will—driving a divided NATO toward a more US-tilted alliance and forcing each member to deepen its commitments, defined by military spending and political obedience, with US national security and interests as the focal point. While his goal is clear enough, and his disdain for NATO’s cumbersome consensus-building and penny‑pinching attitude is widely recognized, his reliance on raw‑power politics risks creating greater uncertainty for the world.

George

希望國會可以通過議案阻止。不過大多數共和黨人都沒有勇氣。

Bryan Chan

其實係咪侵借機迫北約其他成員國踢美國出北約?即係阿侵會話而家係你飛我唔係我飛你(即係美國無虧欠北約)。 我認為而家北約反而成為對付俄羅斯既覊絆。好似前排俄佬飛無人機入波蘭咁樣,仲超過一次,按理警告都俾埋,波蘭應該係要擊落,但似乎係北約條款縛住咗波蘭。我覺得解散咗北約,侵再逐個同啲國家傾軍事合作協議,咁仲靈活。 而家既狀況係,普京睇準北約漏洞,捉住啲懦弱國家唔敢挑戰俄國既心態,成日打擦邊球 Brinkmanship 。一早就應該反擊俾啲顏色普京睇。流氓見拳頭先至識驚。而家普京打到殘晒,北約國家應東西兩邊一齊搞佢,烏克蘭負責正面攻擊,搞到佢顧得頭黎顧唔到對腳。

KTH

其實佢係咪喺度轉移緊視線? 唔想出兵伊朗就不斷咁樣將視線轉移到格陵蘭。呢條友好清楚吹水同真係做呢係有段時間佢講乜嘢呢?喺中間都可以收返返,但係出伊朗呢單嘢呢俾人夾住沙地又唔鍾意佢出咁咪唯有搵第二樣嘢嚟轉移咗個視線大家唔好咁樣成日講啦

Good Year

撇開北約,如果歐洲國家要把美國基地趕走,會如何做?可行性如何?(如果美國因此喪失所有歐洲基地,對「偉大」形象必然有極大打擊。)

Cecil Ma

我反而有興趣想問,既然侵已經出招打爛聯合國,佢有多大興趣打爆埋 NATO?

Gary Lee


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