【國際關係深度評 🇷🇺🇺🇦】 《伊斯坦堡草議》 ：被拒絕的俄羅斯底牌（下）
Added 2024-09-11 02:01:01 +0000 UTC俄羅斯和烏克蘭在開戰初期，一度在土耳其伊斯坦堡達成的共識（「《伊斯坦堡草議》」），另一個值得研究的重點，就是俄羅斯在談判期間提出過哪些條件，而最終又沒有出現在草議最終版本上。這些條件可以看成是俄羅斯的底牌，而沒有出現在最終版本，又可以看作是「可犧牲」的訴求，訊息量很大。
那有甚麼俄羅斯提出的內容是明確被否決的？
首先，俄羅斯要求修改「保證國」對烏克蘭永久中立的安全保證，變成「在所有保證國一致同意的基礎下」，才給予安全保證。這類外交字眼自然不可能瞞過其他外交官，俄羅斯的意思就是化烏克蘭「一對一」與每一個保證國的安全保證承諾，變成所有保證國組成一個「委員會」，必須要全體通過才可以行動，也就是俄羅斯擁有一票否決權。
這樣的「保證」，對烏克蘭自然是毫無意義的，大概莫斯科也明白獲得同意只有兩個可能性，就是完全戰勝，或烏克蘭外交官喪失閱讀能力。
俄羅斯也曾要求烏克蘭禁絕所謂「法西斯主義、納粹主義、新納粹主義、侵略性民族主義」。這些字眼都是虛的，為了化虛為實，俄羅斯當時要求烏克蘭廢除六項與蘇聯時期歷史有關爭議的法律，否定烏克蘭右翼反蘇民族主義者（也就是俄羅斯眼中的「納粹份子」）的歷史地位。本來烏克蘭修改一些形式主義的字眼，讓俄羅斯得到方便自己大內宣的自圓其說，也不應該不能討論，畢竟這比邊境、軍隊、主權等問題彈性得多。
問題是烏克蘭研判普京所指的所謂「去納粹化」，根本就是要澤連斯基下台，將澤連斯基政權影射為「新納粹」，所以這方面就寸土不讓。這些字眼在草議的最後版本也被否決了，大概可視為普京此刻也放棄了烏克蘭「regime change」這個目標（最初他似乎是打算重新扶植已流亡的前烏克蘭親俄總統亞努科維奇回國復辟當傀儡的）。
在烏克蘭「中立」後的軍隊方面，俄羅斯堅持烏克蘭軍隊最多只能保留85,000人、342輛坦克、導彈射程為40公里，全部都是烏方提出底線的不足1/4至1/2，和此刻龐大的烏軍不可同日而語。用一個簡單的歷史概念概括，俄羅斯的想法就像對待戰敗國，烏克蘭的要求就是維持所有正規軍和戰爭期間上升了的軍力、從而得到變相比開戰前強大的軍事影響力，雙方南轅北轍得太厲害，結果就沒有在草議展現。這也可以視為俄羅斯覺得烏克蘭保留多少軍隊並非最重要戰略目的，只要沒有外國軍人、武器，俄羅斯依然不太在乎烏克蘭自身。
從這些跡象可見，起碼俄羅斯並不如開戰前那樣趾高氣揚，也不得不承認自己的實力沒有想像中強大，否則也不用作出一定妥協。不過外間觀察普遍認為持久戰有利於俄羅斯，戰爭越拖下去，俄羅斯的叫價又應該谷底回升，才顯得合理。如果開價不變，可能就反映俄羅斯內部的確有外間不為所知的隱患存在。
▶️ 如果特朗普上台不再軍援烏克蘭，戰爭還能夠打下去嗎？（上）
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ICPfx3RymI
Comments
依家已經係隻眼開隻眼閉, 叫左你唔好, 你仲用? 叫左你啦, 係囉, 叫極你都唔停既
Good Year
2024-09-12 03:51:41 +0000 UTCThe recent Ukrainian offensive seems aiming at lobbying the West, rather than pressuring the Russians. Interesting and bold strategy.
堅離地書院 College
2024-09-11 16:32:29 +0000 UTC美國會否在拜登任內解除使用軍備攻擊俄羅斯核心地段的限制，可能是整場戰爭的關鍵
堅離地書院 College
2024-09-11 16:31:30 +0000 UTCSound so sad 希望以美國為首的西方各國，可以決斷一點
Connie Tse
2024-09-11 09:48:06 +0000 UTCOver the course of more than two and a half years of a relentless war, Kyiv has strived to secure an advantageous conclusion or, at the very least, to prevent an unfavorable settlement that could jeopardize Ukraine's sovereignty or result in territorial concessions. Last year Kyiv sought to gain leverage by breaking through Russian lines in the south and threatening Crimea. Seizing a part of Kursk could offer an alternative means to achieve a similar end, provided Ukraine can maintain control of the territory for a prolonged occupation if needed. It comes as no surprise that the terms of a ceasefire agreement will be largely influenced by the war's progression at the time. Before the Kursk offensive, Russia's leadership believed that the war was progressing in its favor and that time was on its side. This offensive has demonstrated a challenge to Moscow's assumption that the outcome of the war remains unsettled, compelling it to acknowledge that Kyiv still has a card up its sleeve. With no negotiations in the offing, Kyiv could have waited for clarity on U.S. policy post-election before engaging in talks with Russia while trying to create more bargaining chips. On the other hand, there seems to be no pressing incentive for Putin to engage in negotiations at this moment, especially considering Ukraine's current control of its territory. There’re no indications that he’s inclined to do so which could undermine his strongman image. If anything, Russia is expected to sustain offensive pressure on the frontlines and bolster its forces for a potential counterattack at Kursk. An assault from Russia could be more successful during the winter when the dense foliage, which Ukrainian forces currently use for cover, diminishes.¹ By all appearances, Zelenskyy is banking on Ukraine's ability to hold Kursk as a bargaining chip in the event of negotiations pressured by arms suppliers. However, Russia maintains advantages not only in hard power—manpower, equipment, and ammunition—but also in engaging in asymmetric warfare without being burdened by any ethical concerns, which has led to territorial gains since last October. In reality, Russia has since the incursion continued its offensive along the frontlines. It has made advances in the eastern Donetsk region towards the city of Pokrovsk, an important logistics center for Ukrainian forces. In addition, the Kursk offensive has left Ukraine short on reserves to respond to any potential Russian breakthroughs. After the Kharkiv offensive by Russia in May, Ukraine's military finds itself stretched thin, with defensive lines weakening progressively in Donetsk. This allows Russian forces to establish and fortify their defensive positions, potentially complicating Kyiv's ability to launch a counterattack in the future. In a recent “Foreign Affairs” article² the authors, Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, raise a good point. If Ukraine intends to retain control of the Kursk pocket, it must establish defensible positions and disrupt Russian supply lines to isolate forces along the border. Kyiv must decide whether to maintain its current holdings or to invest more already scarce resources into Kursk’s operation in a bid to compel Moscow to deploy Russian forces from the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. Either choice poses significant risks for Ukrainian forces. The optimal outcome would see Ukrainian troops limiting Russian gains in Donetsk while securing Kursk with a sustainable commitment. This offensive may prompt Western policy adjustments regarding long-range weaponry and rejuvenate strategic discussions amidst the ongoing conflict. Conversely, the worst-case scenario entails Ukraine losing substantial eastern territories over time, forfeiting Kursk as a bargaining tool. Advancing further into Russia heightens the danger of overstretching Ukrainian forces.³ Beyond the Kursk offensive and the current frontlines, Russia's ongoing strikes against Ukraine's energy grid are becoming an increasingly serious concern. Ukraine is facing an uncertain winter and urgently needs generators and air defenses to fill gaps in its coverage. More importantly, it requires a way to force Russia to stop these attacks. Lifting the remaining restrictions on Western long-range strike systems is one of the crucial solutions. It appears that the Kursk offensive has initiated this discussion. While the discussion on "no-limit use" is ongoing, more decisive actions are needed, and they must happen quickly. Using Kursk as a bargaining chip, expanding strikes, and exerting economic pressure on Russia could significantly strengthen Ukraine's position. The U.S. and Europe must strictly enforce comprehensive sanctions against any countries that continue to send weapons and their parts, as well as provide any forms of military aid to Russia. HK as a chess piece has been drawn in this geopolitical conflict and will be sacrificed willy-nilly. It’s contingent on Ukraine's ability to maintain its defenses, exhaust Russia's offensive capabilities, and withstand the winter's strike campaign. At the very least, the Kursk offensive needs to provide the impetus for Ukraine and its strategic partners to align on their stance against the Russian invasion without indefinitely grinding the war. If Kyiv cannot reach a consensus with the West soon, a pyrrhic victory —even if come true—would just be a display of the devastation of its young generation, leaving the country with a bleak and desolate future. 1. Some points in the comment are quoted from (2). 2. Kofman, M., Lee, R. (2024, Sep 2). Ukraine’s Gamble: The Risks and Rewards of the Offensive Into Russia’s Kursk Region. Foreign Affairs. 3. Bloomberg reports that a Russian commander claims to have started an offensive to dislodge Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region of Russia, though it remains unclear where Russian troops are deployed from. (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-11/russian-commander-says-counterattack-to-ukraine-incursion-starts)
George
2024-09-11 08:06:03 +0000 UTC俄軍就想拖落去, 不過烏克蘭就已經放手一搏, 西方盟友都係開始默許烏克蘭亂黎, 只要攻擊到俄羅斯既基礎設施, 俄羅斯也不會是無敵的, 俄佬經濟已經完全由政府主導, 當最賺錢既石油最斷, 佢就完, 又呢幾年歐洲既能源自主提升好勁( 風光電), 對天然氣既要求其實係年年下跌
Good Year
2024-09-11 02:56:50 +0000 UTC
