【國際關係深度評 🇺🇸🇨🇦】 徵收加拿大關稅，可以走到《特朗普大宅協定》這終極一步嗎？
Added 2025-02-05 01:01:01 +0000 UTC根據特朗普2.0時代首席經濟國師 Stephen Miran 的理論框架，要顛覆自由主義全球化時代的既定機制，不完全分敵我的關稅戰是不二法門，因為真正的「敵人」其實是整個制度，而不(單)是任何一個國家。而整套策略入面，又有兩個重要步驟。
第一步，就是通過對任何國家、接近無差別威脅徵收不同種類的關稅，達到各種各樣的短期政策目標，同時又逐步提升美國產品的競爭力，讓商人返回美國從事製造業。換句話說，通過關稅勒索各國、與及改善美國貿易逆差這兩個目標，根本是一體兩面，互為表裏，作為方便特朗普隨便運作的槓桿。例如他可以說國家A因為讓步了政策A，而可以暫時豁免增加關稅；又或接受了增加關稅，而默許了其政策A，沒有一成不變的公式。
重點是 Miran 深信當各國要回應美國的新增關稅，除了一定會作出若干政策讓步，還會有結構性後遺症：很可能會對自己的貨幣貶值（人民幣貶值的傳聞已經甚囂塵上）。只要美國主要貿易夥伴的貨幣貶值，根據Miran 的理論，就可以令美國國內的通脹被「抵銷」 -- 坦白說，對這一點如何操作我有大量疑問，能否這樣簡單當然難說，但起碼他真是如此相信的。
Miran 的算式能否落實是未知之數，但無論美國能否從中獲利，有一點倒是肯定的，就是在全球關稅戰的過程中，由於各國都不得不重建貿易壁壘回應，全球自由貿易過去三十年的各種框架就會被逐步打破，自由主義全球化漸漸就名存實亡。當世界各國都重拾關稅、配額等，作為自己捍衛主權和國家利益的武器，現在濫用全球化機制的大國（特別自然是中國），慢慢就只能退回「內循環」的傳統經濟規模。
特朗普對加拿大、墨西哥大增關稅，在微觀層面，確然可以對邊境議題施壓，像特朗普說的非法移民、芬太奇毒品等；但其實無論成敗，都只是煙幕。短期內，美國的開天殺價，一定會有落地還錢的成效。事實證明，墨西哥在最後關頭和特朗普達成協議，承諾派出一萬士兵嚴守美墨邊境，換取暫緩加關稅；哥倫比亞政府也立刻妥協，派專機接回被美國遣返的非法入境者；巴拿馬在美國壓力下，更宣佈退出「一帶一路」，並檢視李嘉誠的長和系管理運河的協議。
凡此種種，都是拜登政府不可能做到的，也的確是捍衛美國國家利益的行為，一定會令特朗普的國內支持者高呼「領袖英明」。日前說過，特朗普2.0在蜜月期不但不會被國際孤立，反而指揮盟友可能會更得心應手（長遠是另一回事）。有了一些國家配合，不配合的國家，就可以順理成章被開刀。
另一邊廂，加拿大總理杜魯多雖然對特朗普作出戰鬥格，但反對黨保守黨領袖、很可能今年就成為下一任加拿大總理的Pierre Poilievre已經明示，為了捍衛加拿大利益，檢視《北美自由貿易協定》、拋棄墨西哥，也不是不可以討論的選擇。
但這些小修小補的討價還價，畢竟還不是關稅戰的主要結構性目標。對特朗普而言，根本整個《北美自由貿易協定》（現在的《美墨加自由貿易協定》）都應該廢除，墨西哥讓步了邊境安全議題，並不代表其他問題可以解決。近年中國已經非常策略性地到墨西哥大舉設廠，然後利用《北美自由貿易協定》對「墨西哥貨物」的關稅優惠，傾銷滲透到美國本土，這種漏洞一日存在，特朗普都不會滿意。
（待續）
▶️ 【國際政治經濟典籍導讀課程・蕭少滔 007A】中美關稅戰前夕，導讀前美國聯儲局主席伯南克名作《救火：金融危機的教訓》（上篇公海區）
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCckHqt5uHY
Comments
又唔駛太驚侵侵放棄對抗獨裁國家，其實睇返最近侵侵做既事，全部都係針對住中共同俄羅斯既預防性措施，巴拿馬，格陵蘭，加墨關稅，退出世衞，都係對抗眾多獨裁國既措施。獨裁國家本身已經緊密合作，並唔會因為侵侵既舉動而更加緊密。
KTH
2025-02-06 11:49:14 +0000 UTC因為執政理念的差異，相信有些發展政策缺乏延續性，甚至因為反對而反對，從而影響其國家的利益。
miuying yu
2025-02-06 11:26:30 +0000 UTCIn a recent article in Foreign Policy,¹ Stephen Walt talked about the significant foreign policy changes under Trump, arguing that his administration's aggressive approach—characterized by tariffs, withdrawal from international organizations, and confrontational rhetoric—could lead to a shift in global alliances and increased resistance from other nations. Walt contrasted two theories of IR: balance-of-threat theory, which suggests that countries will unite against perceived threats, and the theory of collective goods, which highlights the challenges of organizing coordinated opposition. He posited that Trump’s belligerent and radical policies are likely to backfire, resulting in diminished U.S. leadership and increased collaboration among global rivals, as traditional allies begin to view the U.S. as unreliable and potentially hostile. Ultimately, he warned that the U.S. risks alienating its closest partners and losing its global standing. His arguments predominantly focus on traditional theories like balance-of-power and collective goods, while he still views the fabric of the ever-changing world through a conventional lens and seems dismissive of the harms caused by leftist governments. However, it’s essential to recognize that the complexities of contemporary global affairs extend beyond these frameworks. Liberalism, especially in its progressive form, has led to significant changes in how states interact, often promoting ideals such as globalization, human rights, and multilateralism. Over the past few decades, these movements have catalyzed significant shifts in social, economic, and political spheres across the West. The emphasis on values such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and social justice has transformed the priorities of nations and alliances on the global stage. However, many of these movements have swung too far—or, to put it bluntly, getting too extreme and losing touch with reality—in recent years, resulting in backlash and polarization, which have led to the rise of MAGA and nationalism in the name of “revolution of common sense”, trends that Trump’s administration capitalizes on. Moreover, focusing solely on Trump’s policies may unintentionally downplay the underlying structural issues within the international system that paved the way for such a drastic shift. The erosion of trust in institutions, the impact of economic inequality, and disillusionment with globalization are all factors that have intensified global tensions and reshaped alliances. To cope with these challenges, Trump tends to impose maximum pressure on rivals to display his determination and gain an advantageous position at the negotiation table. He might abruptly reverse course on some sweeping tariffs, stunning his adversaries and sparking a significant zigzag in capital markets while underscoring his willingness to risk significant economic disruptions to make a point. Undoubtedly, he prioritizes his economic agenda and the MAGA missions above short-term market volatilities that could unsettle investors. He shows no fear that economic fundamentals and US close bond with its traditional allies might have been compromised by his bold and unorthodox actions. Like it or lump it, Trump's brisk pace of sweeping and assertive reforms in less than a month has highlighted the essential elements of his MAGA roadmap, through which he can proudly stake the claim to fulfilling his campaign promises. Yet some of his actions, such as revoking the security details for some former top officials, seem to be driven more by personal grudge than by political necessity. However, I hope Trump and his administration grasp that now is the critical juncture for the US to maintain its involvement in global affairs. A coalition of dictatorships—an ambitious pseudo-communist one in Beijing, an empire-revival-fueled one in Moscow, and a fundamentalist one in Tehran—has been united by a shared animosity towards the West and an agenda to reshape historical narratives. In the absence of proactive US engagement, these leaders are poised to foster a significantly more tumultuous and perilous world. ¹ Walt, Stephen, “What IR Theory Predicts About Trump 2.0,” Foreign Policy, 3 Feb, 2025. (https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/03/ir-theory-trump-balance-power/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR2RyLTZGLgrNwyDZdorZA1i-KoNZF5HvdLCxfUzY6mQKpYHjVXIDhyQaFc_aem_l53oOqnTmvGbELZIipkYIg)
George
2025-02-05 14:55:53 +0000 UTC似乎 Trump 的成敗很難用微觀衡量，他的微觀目標每天都改變，但宏觀方向相對容易 measure
堅離地書院 College
2025-02-05 13:53:38 +0000 UTC關稅戰 怎樣過度到文中說的第二階段（貨幣戰），目前實在太初步
堅離地書院 College
2025-02-05 13:53:01 +0000 UTC以往可以同一個陣營有延續性，同時避免個人腐敗；任期限制也不是所有國家都有，英國以往很多首相都可以做十多年
堅離地書院 College
2025-02-05 13:52:18 +0000 UTC在商言商，各國領袖謀求所在國的利益，減少貿易逆差也是可以理解，但持續性則受到民主制度選舉的影響，如何能夠做到高瞻遠矚，不受到任期的局限呢？東方大國無論在經濟上，科技上，軍事上都是有計劃謀略的，這些似乎是佔優勢(相對而言)
miuying yu
2025-02-05 11:13:21 +0000 UTC關稅有冇用先不論，Trump2.0撞足四年板後，肯面對真正問題所在，已經係上天保佑！
HO Wong
2025-02-05 03:38:01 +0000 UTC其實單靠貨幣值操控對貿易順逆差影響係互相抵消的，即係對貿易順逆差無影響的。 而家係美國加進口關稅令出口國通過貨幣貶值去應對。美國加關稅本質的確係增加咗進口成本減低進口需求，個成本係由消費者，進口商，出口商之間去承擔，而且世界貿係有好多替代品。如果侵閂咗一道進口門，開返另一道美國本土設廠之門，長期會引進更多外國企業去美國設廠。 所以關稅對出口國係確實有影響，短期可能通過中間人承受去抵消影響，出口國用埋貨幣貶值去短期抵消影響但又增加入口成本長期黎講無法維持。 長期當美國搵到代替品咁被加關稅國家既貨品需求下降關稅既影響就會鞏固。 至於對美國既影響，同被加關稅國既貿易逆差短期未必改善到長期應該有改善，總體貿易逆差短長期都未必改善到。改變貿易逆差始終都靠加強美國出口唔係靠關稅或貨幣政策。 對美國消費者既影響因有替代效應加上進出口商分擔關稅短期長期都唔大。
KTH
2025-02-05 02:48:07 +0000 UTC
